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Abstract 
Innovation is the driving force of social and economic development, 
and a decisive factor in enhancing national competitiveness. In recent years, 
more and more countries have taken innovation to a strategic height. Chinese 
institutional investors have an increasing share of the overall ownership and 
make a remarkable improvement in the market position. Based on an 
increasingly significant role in the capital market, they actively intervene in 
the management of the enterprise, focusing on long-term improvement of 
corporate performance. Correspondingly,  
Institutional investors can also affect the level of technological innovation by 
participating in corporate governance. This study analyzes the mechanism of 
institutional investment affecting the technological innovation of enterprises, 
and takes an empirical test of institutional investors on the impact of 
technological innovation. The results show that the overall ownership of 
institutional investors has a significant positive impact on corporate R&D 
expenditure. This paper proposes that the future policies should still be 
oriented toward the development and support of institutional investors, and 
give further play to their efforts to promote technological innovation of 
enterprises. 
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1. Introduction 
 The development momentum of new scientific and technological 
revolution is becoming more and more rapid. The world economic pattern has 
brought about new changes. Intellectual capital has been replacing labor 
capital and dominates the era of knowledge-based economy. Strengthening 
innovation and stimulating economic growth through innovation have become 
the consensus of most countries in the world. In 2016, Chinese State Council 
issued the ‘Outline of National Innovation-Driven Development Strategy’, 
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which further promoted the development of innovation-driven development to 
the priority of the country and set a goal of entering into an innovation-oriented 
country by 2020, becoming one of the top innovators in the world by 2030, 
and building a world science and technology innovation country by 2050.  
 These three step goals are strategically aimed to make China become 
a leader in a number of important fields and a participant in the formulation of 
important rules by further enhancing independent innovation. As strong 
support for economic and social development, technological innovation 
activities are a kind of special investment behavior of enterprises. They have 
the characteristics of ‘high input, high risk , long investment recovery cycle 
and high expected return’. 
 In 1912, innovative theories proposed by J.A.Joseph firstly attribute 
the driving force of economic development to innovation. Since then, the 
theoretical research on technological innovation has never stopped. With the 
third scientific and technological revolution, a large number of high-tech 
industries have mushroomed, triggering the transformation of a wide range of 
industrial structures and bringing significant economic benefits, which have 
had a tremendous impact on social life and economic development. 
 The academic community has started to pay attention to the company, 
dynamic market entity, constantly studying and defining its technological 
innovation behavior and inherent mechanism of action. Researchers 
constantly verify innovation theories through empirical analysis. Many factors 
affect the technological innovation of enterprises including corporate internal 
and external governance mechanisms is a very important factor. Chinese 
research in related fields started later. At present, the research mainly focuses 
on the influence of internal governance factors such as ownership structure 
and management incentives on the technological innovation of the company. 
In western countries, institutional investors have always been the research 
focus in corporate governance. In recent years, the development of 
institutional investors in China is growing rapidly, and the impact on corporate 
governance has also become increasingly prominent. A lot of literature 
research shows that institutional investors in China have been involved in the 
internal and external governance of listed companies and have the effect of 
influencing the company's investment decision-making. Therefore, logically 
speaking, there is a certain intrinsic relationship between institutional 
investors and enterprises' technological innovation behavior. Most of Chinese 
research focuses on holding preference and investment strategies of 
institutional investors.  
 At present, most Chinese researches on the relation between 
enterprises’ technological innovation and institutional investors are mostly in 
single industry. In the moment when institutional investors in China continue 
to grow, it is worthwhile for institutional investors to be able to restrain short-
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sighted management and promote technological innovation in order to obtain 
a stable return on capital markets. Now that the R & D activities of enterprises 
are so important to the innovative development of enterprises, this study 
continues to explore the impact of institutional investors on R&D expenditure. 
This paper conducts a theoretical and empirical study on the relationship 
between institutional investors and business innovation in China. The research 
in this paper can give advice to the government in guiding the healthy 
development of institutional investors in real economic life and truly play 
important role of capital market.  
 
2. Literature review 
 The research on institutional investors and business innovation mostly 
focuses on the R & D investment of listed companies and also forms a 
relatively complete system. To sum up, there are mainly two kinds of views 
as follows: (1) Institutional investors are pro-active, which will strengthen the 
supervision over the R & D investment behavior of enterprises, restrain the 
managers from reducing R & D investment to carry out earnings management, 
ensure Long-term interests in management decision, so as to promote the 
improvement of enterprise's technological innovation level; (2) Institutional 
investors are negatively short-sighted, focusing only on short-term interests. 
Institutional investors will inhibit R & D investment behavior of the 
management, and negatively impact technological innovation of enterprises. 
 Research literature on the positive role of institutional investors in 
enterprise R & D investment are as follows. Holderness & Sheehan (1988) 
argued that the high proportion of shares held by institutional investors leads 
to higher benefits of voting. So they may choose to influence long-term 
business decision-making, such as R & D investment strategy. Baysinger 
(1989) found that corporate R & D investment is positively related to the 
proportion of institutional investors, and institutional investors can promote 
the realization of long-term business strategies and goals. Black (1992) 
pointed out that institutional investors are more capable of obtaining more 
comprehensive market information than individual investors in corporate 
decision-making. With much more objective and accurate judgments, they are 
motivated to evaluate the long-term benefits of R & D projects and future 
market prospects. They can affect management decision-making to strengthen 
R & D investment in the company. Based on the high-tech industry, Hansen 
& Hill (1991) examined whether institutional investors can improve firm 
performance by exerting pressure on management to change the company's 
R&D investment. The test results show that the relation between institutional 
investors' shareholdings and corporate R&D input is significantly positive. 
Aghion et al. (2009) argued that institutional investors are positively 
correlated with technology innovations in listed companies because they 
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increase the effectiveness of corporate governance. Hoskisson et al. (2002) 
argued that pension funds are positively correlated with the technological 
innovation of listed companies because they are more concerned about the 
long-term benefits. By an empirical study of Korean firms, Suk Bong Choi et 
al. (2012) found that institutional investors and overseas shareholders have a 
positive impact on technological innovation of the company. 
 The passive view of institutional investors is based on ‘short-
sightedness’ theory. The view states that institutional investors face the 
pressure of performance evaluation. In order to enhance their investment 
performance, institutional investors tend to be opportunists with obvious 
speculation, such as using inertial trading strategies to gain the spread and 
over-emphasis on short-term goals. The payback period of R & D investment 
is long and uncertain. Therefore, institutional investors will force management 
to cut down long-term capital expenditures such as R & D to carry out earning 
management, which will have a negative impact on the R & D investment 
activities of enterprises.Falkenstein (1996) pointed out in his research that 
professional fund managers with informational advantages often optimize 
their portfolios by finding the right investment opportunities in the capital 
markets. Once the performance of the invested firms declines, the fund 
managers adjust their holding positions that negatively impact a firm's high-
risk and long-term R &D projects. Froot, Perold & Stein (1992) argued that 
due to information asymmetry, institutional investors cannot effectively 
monitor or assess the quality and effectiveness of R & D expenditures. To a 
certain extent, information asymmetry exacerbates the responses sensitivity of 
institutional investors’ transactions to corporate earnings. Samuel (1996) 
studied data from 557 manufacturing firms in the United States between 1985 
and 1990, and found that institutional investors' shareholdings can boost their 
capital expenditure but had a significant negative impact on their R&D 
spending and advertising expenditures. 
 Institutional investors have long been one of the major research areas 
for corporate governance. The research on the relationship between 
institutional investors and R & D investment started relatively earlier in 
western countries. But Chinese domestic research on this issue is still in a stage 
of gradual development. Whether foreign research results fit our national 
conditions still needs our further exploration. On the whole, these research 
results provide some guidance for the theoretical basis and empirical research. 
Chinese domestic research mainly focuses on institutional investors’ influence 
on corporate management compensation, corporate earnings management, 
corporate performance and dividend policy and so on. Although there is much 
academic research on the impact of institutional investors on corporate 
governance, the research literature on technological innovation in enterprises 
is still relatively few, and the agreed research results and opinions have not 
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been reached yet. This paper studies the influence of institutional investors on 
enterprises’ technical innovation, which caters for the current theme of 
innovation, and presents a relatively new idea. Through empirical analysis and 
research on the impact of institutional investors on the R & D investment of 
listed companies, this study can enrich the theory of corporate external 
governance, and to some extent make recommendations about how to choose 
the institutional investors to effectively participate in corporate governance 
and promote the listed companies Technical innovation to. 
 
3. Hypothesis development 
 Science and technology are the foundation of countries’ strength and 
innovation is the soul of national progress. Faced with increasingly fierce 
competition, technological innovation is also crucial to the survival and 
development of enterprises. Research has shown many factors impact the 
intensity and progress of technological innovation, such as management 
decision-making, investors' expectations of corporate future development, the 
length of the investor's shareholding period, and the amount of information 
that investors hold about the company's R& D activities. 
 Enterprise technology innovation is a special investment behavior. In 
the enterprise hierarchy the decision-making and executive executives have 
the discretion to decide whether or not to make long-term large investments in 
developing new technologies. However, the result of R & D and innovation 
activities is uncertain and lagging. R&D activities of enterprises may show 
effects after many years of substantial continuing investment, and some may 
even be futile. Such uncertainties of R&D investment may conflict with 
management's interests. Corporate management is under pressure to improve 
business performance, and often manage their earnings by cutting R&D 
investment even technology development project is helpful to the future 
development of the company. Myers (1984) also pointed out that disclosing 
information about R&D activities can put companies at a disadvantage in the 
competition. As a result, many corporate management are reluctant to 
voluntarily disclose relevant information, making it difficult for many small 
investors to oversee the management decision-making process .It is more 
difficult to gain a deeper understanding of the true value of enterprise 
technology innovation and long-term development potential. This nature of 
technological innovation activities will widen the information gap between 
investors and corporate management, and influence investors' expectations of 
the future development of the enterprise, and the duration length of their 
shareholding period. Thus it further forces corporate management with greater 
pressure to focus on short-term decision-making. 
 Institutional investors who bring together small and medium-sized 
investors are professionals with an absolute advantage in terms of size, 
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professionalism and information. First, the close relationship between 
institutional investors and corporate management shortens the information gap 
between investors and management, and eliminates the problem of 
information asymmetry. Because their more real and effective information, 
institutional investors can objectively monitor and evaluate effectiveness of 
business management decisions. Second, institutional investors are equipped 
with professional knowledge of financial theory and rich experience in market 
operations. They also receive more information when analyzing open market 
information than ordinary investors. Furthermore, the large holdings and share 
concentration of institutional investors can enhance the institutional investors' 
voice in corporate affairs. With relatively larger shareholdings, institutional 
investors face greater liquidity risk, not free to exit though they have larger 
share of residual claims. 
 Relative to individual investors, institutional investors with these 
advantages are rational. They can have a more objective understanding of 
corporate technological innovation activities. And they also have their own 
accurate analysis and judgment on decision-making of technological 
innovation and corporate value. To some extent, the problem of information 
asymmetry has been eliminated, and the tendency of corporate management 
with performance pressure to adopt short-sighted management decision has 
been reduced. Individual investors' free-riding behavior has been overcome. 
In addition, the large-scale investment holding of institutional investors makes 
them to have incentives to strengthen the supervision of operation and 
management. 
 To sum up, compared with individual investors, institutional investors 
have the advantage of promoting technological innovation and corporate R&D 
investment decisions. Through effectively curbing short-sighted behavior of 
corporate management, institutional investors ensure corporate management 
use Long-term investment funds for enterprises’ technological innovation. 
Based on above analyses, we put forward the main research hypotheses. 
 H1: The proportion of shares held by institutional investors is 
positively correlated with corporate R&D expenditure for technological 
innovation.  
 H1-1b: The shareholding of institutional investors also has a 
positive effect on the increment investment change in R&D expenditure 
for technological innovation. 
 
4. Research design 
4.1 Sample selection and data sources 
 This study refers to classification index of high-tech industries 
announced by China Securities Regulatory Commission and National Bureau 
of Statistics of China. The selected sample of the research was located in 
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Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares from 2009 to 2014. Sample companies 
mainly focus on three industries of manufacturing, scientific research and 
technology services and information transmission, software and technology 
services business. These sample companies have a high degree of innovation 
with R&D expenditure disclosed in detail. In accordance with the above data 
processing standards for processing, we finally get 1,728 sample companies. 
Sample selection and relevant financial data and corporate governance 
structure data are derived from the WIND database and the CSMAR database. 
We use SPSS statistical software to analyze all data available. 
 
4.2 Variables definition  
 Based on existing research literature, we use the indicator of R&D 
intensity to measure business innovation. There are generally three metrics for 
this indicator. These include R&D investment/sales revenue, R&D 
investment/total assets, and R&D investment/ market value, all of which 
eliminate the differential impact of firm size. In this study, R&D 
investment/total assets are used as dependent variables, and R&D 
investment/sales revenue is selected as a surrogate variable in the robustness 
test. Two dependent variables RDI and ΔRDI, are set, which respectively 
represent the intensity and increment of annual R&D expenditure. 
 Explanatory variable is the shareholding ratio of institutional investors, 
denoted by INST. Institutional investors in this study include: social security 
funds, securities investment funds, QFII, securities firms, insurance 
companies, trust companies, financial companies, enterprise annuity. This 
variable INST is the sum of the shareholdings of all these institutions in a listed 
company. We also consider the difference in corporate characteristics. These 
control variables include SIZE, LEV, GROWTH,AGE, SHARE, and 
MANAGESH. The definition of these variables is indicated in table 1 
Table 1 Variables Definition 
Variable Classification Variable Code Variable Definition 
R&D Intensity RDI Annual R & D Expenditure / Total Assets 
R&D Intensity ΔRDI 
(R&D expenditure of the year- R & D 
expenditure of the previous year)/Total assets of 
the year  
Institutional investor ownership 
ratio 
INST 
Institutional investment holdings / Total number 
of shares of the company 
Shareholding Concentration SHARE 
Shareholding number of the largest shareholder 
/ total number of shares  
Executive Shareholding MANSH 
Share number of Executives’ shareholding / 
total number of shares 
Net operating cash flows OCF 
Net cash flows from operating activities / total 
assets 
Enterprise Growth GROWTH 
(Operating Income for the Year - Operating 
Income for the Previous Year) / Operating 
Income for the Previous Year 
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Enterprise Size SIZE In (Total Assets) 
Debt ratio LEV Total debt / total assets 
Year of listing of the enterprise AGE 
The natural logarithm of the number of years 
listed 
Industry Variable INDU control 
Year Variable YEAR control 
 
4.3 Research model 
In this study, to a certain extent to avoid endogenous problems, a lagged period 
of data is used to construct the model. In the study of the impact of institutional 
investors on the technological innovation of enterprises, this article also fully 
considered other factors that affect the innovation of enterprises. To test 
whether the overall ownership of institutional investors has a significant 
impact on technological innovation in enterprises, two regression models are 
established to verify the hypothesis. 
RDIi,t=α+β1INSTi,t-1+β2SHAREi,t-1+β3MANSHi,t-1+β4OCFi,t-
1+β5SIZEi,t-1+β6LEVi,t-1+β7AGEi,t-1+β8INDU+β9YEAR+ε                                                     
（1）          
ΔRDIi,t=α+β1INSTi,t-1+β2SHAREi,t-1+β3MANSHi,t-1+β4OCFi,t-
1+β5SIZEi,t-1+β6LEVi,t-1+β7AGEi,t-1+β8INDU+β9YEAR+ε                                            
（2）                  
  Where i is the cross-sectional individuals (each listed company), t is the year, 
α is the intercept, βi (i = 1,2, ...) is the model regression coefficient, ε is the 
random disturbance term. 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1Descriptive analyses 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of Institutional shareholding and R&D expenditure 
Variable Year Mean Min Max Deviation 
RDI 
2009 0.0241 0.0002 0.2119 0.0278 
2010 0.0237 0.0002 0.2097 0.0261 
2011 0.0268 0.0002 0.1959 0.0271 
2012 0.0384 0.0002 0.2456 0.0345 
2013 0.0414 0.0002 0.2422 0.0353 
2014 0.0436 0.0002 0.2486 0.0379 
INST 
2008 0.3857 0.0036 0.5255 0.2280 
2009 0.4076 0.0034 0.6925 0.2226 
2010 0.4133 0.0041 0.7233 0.2176 
2011 0.4047 0.0038 0.6793 0.2285 
2012 0.4053 0.0036 0.7229 0.2341 
2013 0.4207 0.0037 0.7677 0.2226 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics of control variables 
Variable Mean Min Max Deviation 
SHARE 0.3425 0.1344 0.7156 0.09 
MANSH 0.1283 0.1978 0.6871 0.00 
OCF 0.0447 0.0629 0.2338 -0.1445 
GROWTH 0.1575 0.2210 1.7316 -0.2333 
SIZE  21.6926 1.0069 25.015 19.6985 
LEV 0.4142 0.1957 0.8953 0.0466 
AGE 1.8540 0.7437 3.0445 0.6931 
 
 As shown in Table 2, the average share of institutional investors in 
2008-2013 is 38.57%, 40.76%, 41.33%, 40.47%, 40.53% and 42.07% 
respectively. Generally speaking, it is a gradual increase trend, especially in 
2013, a larger increase. This shows that institutional investors are gradually 
becoming an important force in China's capital market, but there is a big gap 
between the institutional investors in different companies. The RDI , R&D 
expenditure of technological innovation has also shown a clear upward trend. 
It can be seen that the shareholding ratio of institutional investors is consistent 
with the overall trend of changes in input indicators of technological 
innovation. However, there are still relatively more differences in 
technological innovations among different enterprises. Under normal 
circumstances, the R&D expenditure intensity of enterprises needs to reach 
2% in order to survive, reaching more than 5% to be competitive, so the R & 
D investment of listed companies in China still need to be strengthened. In 
general, most enterprises are growing fast, which is related to the sample 
selection of enterprises with high technology content. It shows that the 
difference of ownership concentration between enterprises is relatively large, 
and the degree of incentive mechanism of management shareholding among 
different listed companies is different. 
 
5.2 Correlation analyses 
 In order to make the model more scientific, before the regression, we 
use the Pearson correlation coefficient test method to test the correlation 
between the variables. If the correlation coefficient between the variables is 
small, then the correlation degree between the variables is not very large.  
There is no serious multicollinearity problem between variables. From table 
4, we can clearly see that all the correlation coefficients between variable are 
less than 0.5, which is within the acceptable range. Therefore, although we 
choose more control variables, there is no significant multicollinearity 
between the explanatory variables and the control variables. 
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Table 4  Pearson correlation coefficient between explanatory variables and control variables 
 INST MANSH SHARE GROWTH OCF SIZE LEV AGE 
INST 1        
MANSH 
-
0.4813 
1       
SHARE 0.3418 -0.1013 1      
GROWTH 0.0078 0.0078 0.0134 1     
OCF 0.1488 -0.0139 0.0708 -0.0031 1    
SIZE 0.3521 0.2927 0.2152 0.0269 0.0729 1   
LEV 0.0348 -0.1219 -0.0086 0.004 
-
0.0664 
0.0852 1  
AGE 0.2684 0.3047 -0.0629 0.0227 0.0067 0.3925 0.1555 1 
 
5.3 Regression results 
 Because of some endogenous problems between institutional investors 
and enterprise technology innovation, this study selected a lagged period of 
data for testing. Taking into account the existence of heteroskedasticity with 
mixed cross-sectional data, regression analyses use White Gaussian variance 
covariance matrix to revise the regression equation. Regression results of 
institutional shareholding on R&D expenditure intensity are shown in Table 
5. From table 5, we can see that the RDI regression model has a R2 of 0.1495 
(F value of 82.67), and the  ΔRDI regression model has a R2of 0.0121with F 
value of 5.18. The reason is that there are many factors that affect 
technological innovation of enterprises. The explanatory and control variables 
selected by the article cannot include all the influencing factors.  
 The regression results indicate coefficients of all variables are 
significant, and the sign of coefficient estimates are basically in line with the 
realistic economic expectation. It shows that the model can give a more 
scientific explanation for the impact of institutional investors on technological 
innovation of enterprises. From Table 5, we can see that the overall 
shareholding ratio of institutional investors, INST, is positively correlated to 
R&D expenditure, RDI and ΔRDI at significant level 1%. These empirical 
results indicate that the higher the proportion of institutional investors’ 
shareholding, the more R&D and incremental R&D expenditure invested by 
enterprises. To some extent, it show institutional investors can better promote 
corporate investment in technological innovation. These research results 
support hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2. This conclusion is also consistent with 
the many scholars’ studies in line with the market rules that institutional 
ownership can improve corporate governance. At the same time, the 
conclusion of the study is of great significance to the vigorous development 
of institutional investors in China and provides a practical basis for Chinese 
government to formulate policies to encourage institutional investors to 
participate in technological innovation of enterprises. 
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Table 5 Institutional investor ownership of R & D intensity of the regression results 
Coefficient 
RDI (OLS) 
Model 1 
ΔRDI (OLS) 
Model 2 
Intercept 
0.1261*** 
（12.39） 
0.0042 
（0.58） 
INST 
0.0112*** 
（4.64） 
0.0060*** 
（3.00） 
MANSH 
0.0272*** 
（7.83） 
0.0086*** 
（3.13） 
SHARE 
-0.0185*** 
（-5.05） 
-0.0050* 
（-1.79） 
GROWTH 
0.0137*** 
（3.12） 
0.0032* 
（1.78） 
OCF  
0.0075 
（0.99） 
0.0117** 
（2.12） 
SIZE 
-0.0034*** 
（-6.94） 
-0.0003 
（-0.78） 
LEV 
-0.0052** 
（-2.39） 
-0.0063*** 
（-3.82） 
AGE 
-0.0090*** 
（-10.68） 
0.0020*** 
（2.90） 
YEAR Control Control 
INDUS Control Control 
F-statistic 82.67***  5.18*** 
R2 0.1495 0.0121 
N 4006 4006 
***significant at the 1% level   **significant at the 5% level   *significant at the 10% level 
 
 In addition, MANSH is highly positively correlated with the intensity 
of R & D investment at 1% significant level. It indicates that senior 
management ownership makes corporate management have sufficient 
incentive to participate in promoting technological innovation of enterprises, 
which effectively reduce agency problem in corporate operation. From this, 
management shareholding incentives encourage increase in R&D investment, 
which is beneficial to the enhancement of corporate long-term value. Variable 
SHARE is highly negatively correlated with R&D investment at 1% 
significant level. It indicate that the higher the proportion of large 
shareholders, the more motivation for them to occupy private interests by 
invading corporate long-term interests. 
 Thus abuse behaviors of majority shareholders reduce corporate R&D 
investment and weaken technological innovation. Variable GROWTH is 
highly positively correlated to R&D intensity, indicating that the higher the 
growth of enterprises, the more motivation to increase R&D investment to 
maintain its core competitiveness in order to expand market share. There is a 
significant negative correlation between the debt ratio (LEV) and 
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technological innovation behavior of enterprises, which indicates that the 
greater the financial risk, the lower the willingness of technological 
innovation. To some extent, for highly leveraged companies cash flows are 
strictly constrained, which hinder the improvement of technological 
innovation. Net cash flow from business activities (OCF), though not 
significant, also positively influenced the expenditure in technological 
innovation. 
 
5.4 Robustness test 
 In order to verify the correctness of the conclusion, this study also have 
robustnesee test to examine the relationship between institutional investors' 
shareholding and technological innovation behavior of enterprises. In robust 
test we use the method of substituting variables and downsizing samples 
respectively from two aspects. We standardize R&D investment and replace 
explanatory variable with RDR, which is R&D expenditure divided by total 
sales. We also have some sub-sample tests. All hypothetical models of this 
study are validated to prevent the conclusions of the study from being biased 
due to objective reasons. For all variables, including the control variables, the 
sign of the estimates are consistent with the regression analysis, indicating that 
the research on enterprise innovation investment has a certain scientific and 
stability. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 Based on theoretical basis of institutional investors’ participation in 
corporate governance, this study explores the relationship between 
institutional investors and corporate innovation in the academic field. This 
study analyzes the mechanism of institutional investors' impact on corporate 
technological innovation. We found that institutional investor ownership is 
positively correlated with corporate total and incremental R&D investment. 
As a result, The participation of institutional investors positively impact 
enterprise Technology Innovation. We have reason to believe that increasing 
the proportion of institutional investors ’shareholdings can effectively 
promote and encourage innovative improvement of enterprises. It further 
provides the impetus for healthy development of Chinese capital market, and 
promotes the transformation and upgrading of Chinese economy. The 
research results of this paper can play an enlightening role in the improvement 
of corporate governance mechanism and the development of institutional 
investors. The result shows that institutional investors in the Chinese market 
generally promote technological innovation behavior of enterprises. 
Therefore, this study proposes that Chinese regulators continue to cultivate 
and develop institutional investors. Effective participation mechanism from 
institutional investors would enhance the core competitiveness of enterprises 
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and achieve the goal of improving corporate performance. As a result, we 
should motivate institutional investors actively participate in supervising 
technological innovation activities in enterprises. 
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